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What Did President Putin Do to Serve More Than Two Terms? — A Legal and Constitutional Analysis
Introduction
Vladimir Putin has been a defining figure in Russian politics for more than two decades. Legally speaking, his longevity in office raises significant questions about constitutional engineering, institutional change, and the rule of law. To understand how he managed to extend his potential presidency well beyond what many would expect under standard democratic norms, one must examine a series of legal, constitutional, and political maneuvers — notably, the 2020 constitutional reform and its legal implications.
Background: Term Limits in Russia’s Pre-2020 Constitutional Framework
The original constitutional architecture of the Russian Federation, established in 1993, placed considerable emphasis on avoiding the re-emergence of an entrenched executive. The drafters, shaped by both the Soviet legacy and the turbulent political conditions of the early 1990s, sought to create a presidency that was powerful but nonetheless restrained by clearly formulated term limits. Under Article 81 of the 1993 Constitution, an individual could be elected President of the Russian Federation for a term of four years and could not hold the office for more than two consecutive terms. This phrasing — specifying consecutive rather than total terms — was deliberate and became a focal point for later political maneuvering.
The “consecutive terms” concept served as an implicit compromise between two constitutional objectives. On the one hand, it aimed to prevent the monopolization of executive power by a single individual, reflecting the newly independent state’s desire to distance itself from the authoritarian tendencies of the Soviet period. On the other hand, the clause afforded a degree of flexibility: a former president, after stepping down, was not excluded from re-entering politics at the highest level once they had observed a mandated interval away from the presidency. This framework positioned term limitations more as a mechanism of rotation than as a strict lifetime bar.
During the early years of the Russian Federation, the interpretation of these provisions was primarily theoretical, as the political system was still in formation and no president had yet reached the two-term threshold. However, as Vladimir Putin neared the end of his second term in 2008, the constitutional language assumed practical significance.
The legal debate centered not on whether a third consecutive term was permissible — the Constitution clearly forbade this — but on whether the prohibition extended beyond sequential tenure to impose a substantive limit on the total number of terms that an individual could serve over the span of their life. Since the Constitution did not explicitly ban non-consecutive returns to the presidency, the prevailing interpretation, supported by state institutions, was that the clause required only a temporary step aside, not permanent withdrawal.
This interpretation had profound constitutional implications. It effectively opened the door for a political figure to maintain long-term influence through a rotation of formal and informal roles, so long as the strict textual requirement — a break between sets of two terms — was observed. The presidency could thus be vacated without relinquishing political primacy, provided the individual continued to control the mechanisms of government through alternative positions or political alliances.
Furthermore, the pre-2020 framework offered another noteworthy structural feature: it did not anticipate a situation in which the presidency would be occupied by a close political associate acting as a placeholder. The Constitution assumed that political pluralism and competitive elections would minimize the risk of one individual indirectly extending their influence beyond the two-term limit. In practice, however, this expectation underestimated the degree of centralization that could emerge in a system marked by strong presidential authority and weak institutional counterbalances.
In essence, the pre-2020 constitutional design attempted to strike a balance between the necessity of executive stability and the protection against indefinite rule. Yet the very flexibility that allowed a former president to return after a hiatus created the legal space later used to navigate around the intended constraints. The structure was not inherently defective, but it relied heavily on political norms and self-restraint — factors that proved increasingly fragile as the Russian political system consolidated around a single dominant figure.
The 2020 Constitutional Reform: Resetting the Clock
The 2020 constitutional reform marked a decisive turning point in Russia’s constitutional development. Whereas the pre-existing framework relied on the notion of consecutive term limits to balance executive continuity with periodic rotation, the reform fundamentally recalibrated this relationship. Its most consequential provision — the “resetting” of presidential terms accumulated under the prior constitutional order — represented a profound modification of the constitutional logic surrounding presidential succession and tenure.
The reform did not simply amend the duration or number of presidential terms; it re-contextualized the historical record of presidential service. The introduction of a new constitutional clause providing that the restrictions on presidential terms would apply only to terms served after the amendment took effect had the practical effect of nullifying all previous presidential mandates for eligibility purposes. Legally speaking, it created a clean constitutional slate. In doing so, it did not alter the formal rule that no individual may serve more than two presidential terms; instead, it redefined the starting point from which the rule would be counted.
This technique — altering the temporal scope of constitutional provisions without changing their substantive text — is an established method in constitutional engineering. It allows political systems to preserve the appearance of continuity while enabling specific political outcomes. In the Russian context, the reset functioned as a transitional clause inserted into a broader constitutional revision process. Transitional or “bridge” provisions are typically used to manage disruptions that arise when states overhaul significant constitutional structures. Here, however, the device was deployed not to facilitate systemic adaptation but to extend the political viability of a specific officeholder within a largely stable institutional framework.
From a doctrinal perspective, the reset clause operates on two levels. The first is formal legality. The Constitution, as amended through the prescribed procedure, explicitly permitted the exclusion of prior presidential terms from the term-limit count. Because the reform followed the established amendment process — involving parliamentary approval, constitutional review, and a nationwide vote — the resulting changes possess full constitutional legitimacy in a strictly procedural sense.
The second level concerns constitutionalism as a normative structure, which is more demanding than mere procedural correctness. Constitutionalism presupposes limits on political power, the preservation of the separation of powers, and the prevention of personalist rule through institutional design. From this standpoint, the reform raises substantial concern. By introducing a reset mechanism tailored to the situation of a single incumbent, the amendment blurred the line between general constitutional norms and individual political interests. It effectively replaced a system of impersonal rules with one shaped by the preferences of the dominant political actor, thereby weakening the normative expectation that constitutional provisions should be stable, predictable, and universally applicable.
In addition to resetting the presidential term count, the 2020 reform simultaneously reinforced the structural architecture of the presidency. It broadened the president’s authority over the executive and judiciary, enhanced the capacity to appoint and dismiss key officials, and expanded influence across various institutional levels. The reset clause, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation. Its significance is magnified when viewed against the backdrop of strengthened presidential prerogatives, which provide a more secure environment for prolonged political dominance.
Furthermore, the reform exhibits a sophisticated understanding of political risk management. By enabling the incumbent to lawfully extend his tenure, the amendment removed uncertainties associated with leadership transition — uncertainties that might otherwise provoke elite fragmentation or destabilize the system. In this respect, the reform was not only a constitutional maneuver but also a strategy of regime consolidation. It addressed what political theorists often call the “succession dilemma,” wherein long-serving leaders seek to preserve both their personal security and the stability of the political order they oversee.
The resulting legal reality is a hybrid construct. On the surface, the Constitution maintains the principle of term limitation, thereby continuing to affirm a formal commitment to rotational leadership. Substantively, however, the reset neutralizes the limitation for the individual who most directly shaped — and stands to benefit from — the reform. This duality exemplifies a phenomenon increasingly observed in contemporary constitutional practice: the use of legal mechanisms not to dismantle existing limits but to strategically reinterpret them in service of prolonged incumbency.
In summary, the 2020 constitutional reform did not merely modify the legal text governing the presidency; it recalibrated the normative framework underlying presidential succession. By employing a transitional mechanism capable of re-defining the temporal boundaries of term limits, it transformed an established instrument of democratic accountability into a device for extending executive longevity. The reform thus illustrates how constitutional change, when executed through formal legal pathways, can nonetheless generate outcomes that challenge the underlying principles of constitutionalism itself.
The Process: From Proposal to Approval
The path by which the 2020 constitutional reform was introduced, debated, and approved reveals as much about the functioning of Russia’s constitutional order as the substantive changes themselves. While the process adhered outwardly to the formal requirements for constitutional amendment, it unfolded in a manner that demonstrated the considerable concentration of political and institutional authority in the executive branch and its allied structures. As such, examining the procedural dimension is crucial for understanding how the reform achieved its intended legal and political outcomes.
The process began in January 2020, when the President unexpectedly proposed a package of constitutional revisions during an annual address. This mode of initiation is noteworthy: constitutional change was not triggered by a national debate, an institutional deadlock, or public demand, but emerged from a top-down directive. This immediate framing placed the proposal within the President’s legislative agenda rather than within a broader deliberative process. It also signaled to the legislative branches that the initiative carried a political imperative, shaping the manner in which parliament would subsequently engage with it.
Following the President’s proposal, the draft amendments were introduced to the State Duma, the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly. The speed with which the Duma acted reflected a legislative environment aligned closely with the executive. The chamber conducted multiple readings of the bill in rapid succession, each stage characterized by overwhelming majority support and limited substantive debate. The legislative procedure was thus formally correct—parliament exercised its authority to consider and vote on amendments—but materially constrained by political dynamics that minimized the possibility of critical examination or alternative drafting proposals.
A decisive moment in the process occurred during the second reading, when an amendment was introduced that explicitly provided for the resetting of presidential terms served before the reform. The origin of this clause, attributed publicly to a respected parliamentary figure, was framed as a contribution to legal clarity and constitutional stability. However, its timing and context suggest a carefully orchestrated insertion designed to align the constitutional framework with the political objective of enabling continued presidential eligibility. By introducing this clause at a mid-procedural stage, the process avoided prolonged public scrutiny while remaining within the formal bounds of parliamentary procedure.
The Federation Council, Russia’s upper chamber, approved the amendments shortly thereafter. Its role, though constitutionally significant, functioned largely as a procedural affirmation rather than a forum for independent constitutional deliberation. Given its composition and relationship with regional executive authorities, the Council tends to reflect the political direction of the federal center, and its rapid endorsement of the reform underscored this structural tendency.
Once approved by both chambers of the Federal Assembly, the amendments were forwarded to the Constitutional Court for review. Under Russian constitutional practice, this step is essential for ensuring compliance with foundational principles and procedural standards. The Court’s endorsement—delivered swiftly and affirmatively—asserted that the amendments did not violate constitutional norms, including those related to democratic governance, federal structure, and separation of powers. While technically sound within the parameters defined by the Constitution, the review was characterized more by deference to the political branches than by robust judicial scrutiny.
The final stage involved securing approval from regional legislatures and subjecting the reform to a nationwide vote. The regional endorsements proceeded rapidly, reflecting federal political alignment and the hierarchical nature of center–region relations. The nationwide vote, although not constitutionally required for all types of amendments, served as a politically symbolic act intended to confer broader legitimacy. The procedure was framed as a demonstration of public support, despite criticisms concerning the nature of the voting environment, the lack of competitive public discourse, and the symbolic—rather than determinative—character of the outcome.
Taken together, the process exemplified a model of constitutional amendment that emphasizes formal procedural compliance while limiting democratic contestation. Each institutional actor performed its constitutionally prescribed role, yet the overarching trajectory of the reform was predetermined by political cohesion within the governing apparatus. Instead of functioning as sites of independent constitutional deliberation, the legislative and judicial institutions largely facilitated the executive’s objectives.
The process thus highlights a structural reality of the Russian constitutional system: while the amendment mechanisms are designed to ensure flexibility and legal continuity, their practical operation can be shaped decisively by concentrated political authority.
Other Institutional and Legal Changes Favoring Executive Power
In addition to term-limit reset, the 2020 constitutional reform included other changes that strengthen the presidency more broadly:
- Expanded Presidential Powers: The amendments increased the president’s control over the government, including the ability to dismiss the prime minister, and gave the president more influence over the judiciary.
- Lifetime Immunity: Former presidents receive lifelong immunity, and also become ex officio members of the Federation Council (the upper house of parliament).
- Institutionalization of the State Council: The reform also elevated the role of the State Council (an advisory body composed of regional leaders) in the constitutional system — consolidating a mechanism that helps institutionalize Putin’s influence.
- Sovereignty and Ideological Clauses: The amendments enshrined the supremacy of the Russian constitution over international law, and included conservative social policy provisions (e.g., defining marriage in traditional terms).
Legal and Constitutional Critiques
From a legal and democratic theory standpoint, several critiques arise:
- Reset vs. Spirit of the Law: While the text of the new constitution allows for two terms total going forward, critics argue that resetting prior terms undermines the spirit of limitations on power.
- Legitimacy of the Vote: The nationwide vote has been criticized for its structure and conduct. Some analysts argue that it functioned more like a “referendum-like” show than a fully free and fair democratic process.
- Power Centralization: The broader constitutional amendments do more than simply reset terms — they consolidate executive power (over government, judiciary, and regions), raising concerns about checks and balances.
- Long-Term Rule: By enabling him to run potentially until 2036, these reforms may erode mechanisms for leadership renewal, thereby concentrating political power in a single individual for decades.
Strategic Motivations
Why did Putin pursue this change?
- Stability Narrative: Putin and his backers have framed the reforms as necessary for stability, continuity, and national strength.
- Avoiding Power Vacuum: By ensuring his possibility to remain president, Putin may have sought to avoid becoming a “lame duck” in the remainder of his then-current term, thereby preventing internal power struggles or succession battles.
- Institutional Entrenchment: Resetting term limits, combined with expanding institutional powers, serves to entrench his position not just personally but structurally, through bodies like the State Council.
- Legacy: Ensuring a long, possibly multi-decade tenure reinforces his legacy in the narrative of Russian resurgence and strong centralized rule.
Implications for Rule of Law and Democratic Governance
The legal architecture crafted through the 2020 constitutional changes has profound implications:
- Erosion of Term-Limit Safeguards: While term limits persist on paper, the reset mechanism effectively negates past democratic guardrails and resets the democratic accountability clock.
- Hybrid Institutional Model: By merging formal constitutional reform with political control, the Russian system becomes more hybrid — chiefly democratic in form, but strongly centralized in practice.
- Precedent for Personalist Rule: The approach taken may serve as a precedent for future leaders to similarly adjust constitutional rules, normalizing personalization of power.
- Long-Term Power Consolidation: The combination of legal reset, institutional strengthening, and electoral legitimacy through a public vote consolidates power in a way that is structurally resilient and legally embedded.
Conclusion
In sum, President Putin’s ability to serve more than two terms is not a result of mere political maneuvering or improvised exploitation of loopholes — it is the product of a deliberate, institutional, and legal strategy. Through the 2020 constitutional reform, he effectively “zeroed out” his prior terms, rewrote the rules in his favor, and fortified the presidency both legally and institutionally.
From a rule-of-law perspective, these maneuvers raise serious questions about how constitutionalism, democratic norms, and separation of powers function under centralized authority. For students of law, politics, and governance, Putin’s case illustrates how deeply entrenched political power can be perpetuated through formal legal mechanisms.
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